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The Regulation of Digital Investment Advice 
Christine Lazaro 
I. Introduction 
Studies have shown that America is facing a “retirement savings crisis.”1  As employers 
move away from defined benefit plans towards defined contribution plans, Americans 
are facing greater responsibility for managing their retirement savings.  Many facing 
retirement do not have any savings, and of those that do, most do not have enough to 
support their standard of living throughout retirement.2  According to one study, as of 
2015, 57% of workers have less than $25,000 in total household savings with 28% 
having less than $1,000 in savings.3   
It is also difficult for investors with a small amount saved to obtain investment advice 
because of the high account minimums for many financial advisors.4  Studies have 
shown that only 20% of “mass affluent” Americans, those with $250,000 to $1 million 
in savings, utilize a financial advisor.5 Additionally, some may find online advice to be 
more attractive and less intimidating, especially for younger investors.6  This will 
become more important over the next several decades, as nearly $30 trillion in assets is 
expected to transfer from baby boomers to more tech-savvy millennials.7   
Digital investment advice, or robo-advice, is a growing trend in the financial services 
industry.  It is expected that by 2022, robo-advisers will manage over $4 trillion in 
assets.8  In early 2018, Vanguard’s digital advice platform crossed the $100 billion AUM 
marker.9 At that time, Schwab’s digital advice services managed $25 billion in assets, 
and Betterment, the largest independent robo-adviser, managed over $10 billion in 
assets.10   
                                                        
1 See Jennifer L. Klass & Eric Perelman, The Evolution of Advice:  Digital Investment Advisers as 




3 See BLACKROCK, Digital Investment Advice:  Robo Advisors Come of Age 2 (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-digital-investment-advice-
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http://heidrick.com/-/media/future financial advice/Future of digital financial advice.ashx.  
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According to EY, the average account size at robo-advisers is between $20,000 and 
$100,000, demonstrating capture of millennials and the lower segments of the market.11  
Betterment reports that, while the average age of its investors is around 35, 30% of its 
business comes from people over 50.12 
Robo-advice has become an important tool in the advice toolbox.  But what is robo-
advice?  How is it regulated?  This article will address these two issues. 
II. What is Robo-Advice? 
Robo-advice covers a wide range of services, however all involve advice derived from 
algorithms.13  Robo-advice tends to differ with respect to three important aspects:  “(1) 
end user of the digital advice; (2) range of investment advice and options provided; and 
(3) level of human investment adviser interaction.”14   
With respect to the end user, it may be a financial advisor, or an investor, working alone 
or with a financial advisor.15  Robo-advisers may integrate the advice platform with 
human investment advisers; offer digital advice with human support; or offer wholly 
digital advice.16  In terms of the services offered, robo-advisers will provide personalized 
financial advice based on information provided by the customer.17 However, many robo-
advisers will limit recommendations to exchange-traded funds and mutual funds.18  
Last, the level of human interaction may vary by adviser.  Even with purely digital 
advisers, humans must be involved in the design of the platforms and algorithms, as 
well as compliance to ensure the adviser complies with the relevant rules and 
regulations.19  Some advisers also provide access to human investment advisers, but may 
limit the method and frequency of the contact.20 
Robo-advisers often gather information about their clients through the use of on-line 
questionnaires.  These questionnaires can vary in terms of the length and the types of 
information gathered.21  Some ask for age, income, and financial goals; others seek 
additional information including investment horizon, risk tolerance, and expenses.22  
The SEC observed that sometimes the questionnaires do not offer the investor the 
opportunity to provide additional information; and some do not follow up to clarify 
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answers or investigate seemingly inconsistent answers.23  These issues represent a few 
of the challenges facing wholly digital robo-advisers. 
III. The Regulation of Robo-Advisers 
Robo-advisers generally rely on Rule 3a-4 under the Investment Company Act of 1940.24  
This rule provides advisers that manage “discretionary investment advisory programs” 
with a safe harbor from being classified as an “investment company.”25  The adviser 
must meet the following requirements, among others:   
(1) each client's account in the program is managed on the basis of the 
client's financial situation and investment objectives and in accordance with 
any reasonable restrictions imposed by the client on the management of the 
account; 
…  
(2)(iv) the sponsor and personnel of the manager of the client's account who 
are knowledgeable about the account and its management are reasonably 
available to the client for consultation.26 
Some critics argue that robo-advisers may not satisfy these requirements.27  However, 
with respect to the provision of individualized advice, it is likely many robo-advisers are 
able to satisfy this requirement.  Many robo-advisers do not require investors to 
determine their own risk tolerance and investment preferences – the robo-adviser will 
make recommendations based on the information provided by the investor in a 
questionnaire.  Many robo-advisers will allow further customization by the investor.  
For example, “[d]igital advisers offer many features and tools that a client or adviser 
may use to personalize portfolios, including financial planning tools to inform portfolio 
selection; portfolio allocations that clients may customize to their desired asset class 
mix; the ability to retain legacy positions; sophisticated, technology-driven portfolio 
rebalancing based on market changes, cash in-flows and out-flows, and risk parameters; 
and asset placement and tax-loss harvesting services.”28  As a result, the advice is 
personalized, and the client has the ability to further customize or restrict the advice. 
With respect to the availability of robo-advisers, many are more available than human 
advisers.  Rule 3a-4 does not specify the nature of the availability, making it possible for 
robo-advisers to meet this requirement through the use of the digital interface.  For 
example, “[d]igital advisers typically provide their clients with around-the-clock access 
to a great deal of interactive real-time information about the holdings, performance and 
attributes of their account…Further, many digital advisers supplement their online 
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25 See Klass, supra n. 1, 11. 
26 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a–4(a)(1) and (a)(2)(iv). 
27 See Klass, supra n. 1, 11. 
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offerings with telephone, email and chat features that allow clients to ask more specific 
questions about the management of their accounts in real time.”29 
Although robo-advisers may rely on a safe harbor to avoid registration as an investment 
company, robo-advisers are regulated as investment advisers pursuant to the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”).30  Accordingly, robo-advisers are 
subject to the same rules and regulations governing other registered investment 
advisers.  Under the Advisers Act, an investment adviser is a fiduciary, and as such, the 
adviser is subject to a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.31  “The duty of loyalty refers to 
the obligation to act loyally for the client’s benefit, which requires that the adviser place 
the client’s interests ahead of its own.  The duty of care refers to the obligation to act 
with the care, competence, and diligence that would normally be exercised by a fiduciary 
in similar circumstances.”32 
A. SEC Guidance 
In 2017, the SEC issued guidance for robo-advisers with respect to three main areas: 
1. The substance and presentation of disclosures to clients about the robo-
adviser and the investment advisory services it offers; 
2. The obligation to obtain information from clients to support the robo-
adviser’s duty to provide suitable advice; and 
3. The adoption and implementation of effective compliance programs 
reasonably designed to address particular concerns relevant to 
providing automated advice.33  
This section will review each area of focus that the SEC identified. 
a. Disclosure 
Investment advisers have an obligation to make “full and fair disclosure of all material 
facts to, and to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading, clients.”34  The SEC 
suggests that robo-advisers provide an explanation of its business practices to ensure 
that clients understand how the robo-adviser provides investment advice.35  Specifically, 
the SEC suggests that robo-advisers provide the following information: 
 A statement that an algorithm is used to manage individual client 
accounts;  
 A description of the algorithmic functions used to manage client 
accounts (e.g., that the algorithm generates recommended portfolios; 
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31 See Klass, supra n. 1, 7. 
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that individual client accounts are invested and rebalanced by the 
algorithm);  
 A description of the assumptions and limitations of the algorithm used 
to manage client accounts (e.g., if the algorithm is based on modern 
portfolio theory, a description of the assumptions behind and the 
limitations of that theory);  
 A description of the particular risks inherent in the use of an algorithm 
to manage client accounts (e.g., that the algorithm might rebalance 
client accounts without regard to market conditions or on a more 
frequent basis than the client might expect; that the algorithm may not 
address prolonged changes in market conditions);  
 A description of any circumstances that might cause the robo-adviser to 
override the algorithm used to manage client accounts (e.g., that the 
robo-adviser might halt trading or take other temporary defensive 
measures in stressed market conditions);  
 A description of any involvement by a third party in the development, 
management, or ownership of the algorithm used to manage client 
accounts, including an explanation of any conflicts of interest such an 
arrangement may create (e.g., if the third party offers the algorithm to 
the robo-adviser at a discount, but the algorithm directs clients into 
products from which the third party earns a fee);  
 An explanation of any fees the client will be charged directly by the robo-
adviser, and of any other costs that the client may bear either directly or 
indirectly (e.g., fees or expenses clients may pay in connection with the 
advisory services provided, such as custodian or mutual fund expenses; 
brokerage and other transaction costs);  
 An explanation of the degree of human involvement in the oversight and 
management of individual client accounts (e.g., that investment 
advisory personnel oversee the algorithm but may not monitor each 
client’s account);  
 A description of how the robo-adviser uses the information gathered 
from a client to generate a recommended portfolio and any limitations 
(e.g., if a questionnaire is used, that the responses to the questionnaire 
may be the sole basis for the robo-adviser’s advice; if the robo-adviser 
has access to other client information or accounts, whether, and if so, 
how, that information is used in generating investment advice); and  
 An explanation of how and when a client should update information he 
or she has provided to the robo-adviser.36 
The SEC is also concerned that certain disclosures may have the potential to mislead 
clients, accordingly, the SEC cautions against implying the following: 
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 The robo-adviser is providing a comprehensive financial plan if it is not 
in fact doing so (e.g., if the robo-adviser does not take into consideration 
a client’s tax situation or debt obligations, or if the investment advice is 
only targeted to meet a specific goal—such as paying for a large purchase 
or college tuition—without regard to the client’s broader financial 
situation);  
 A tax-loss harvesting service also provides comprehensive tax advice; or  
 Information other than that collected by the questionnaire (e.g., 
information concerning other client accounts held with the robo-
adviser, its affiliates or third parties; information supplementally 
submitted by the client) is considered when generating investment 
recommendations if such information is not in fact considered.37 
Finally, the SEC offers guidance with respect to the presentation and timing of 
disclosures.  The SEC suggests that robo-advisers consider the following with respect to 
their disclosures: 
 Whether key disclosures are presented prior to the sign-up process so 
that information necessary to make an informed investment decision is 
available to clients before they engage, and make any investment with, 
the robo-adviser;  
 Whether key disclosures are specially emphasized (e.g., through design 
features such as pop-up boxes);  
 Whether some disclosures should be accompanied by interactive text 
(e.g., through design features such as tooltips) or other means to provide 
additional details to clients who are seeking more information (e.g., 
through a “Frequently Asked Questions” section); and  
 Whether the presentation and formatting of disclosure made available 
on a mobile platform have been appropriately adapted for that 
platform.38 
In summary, a robo-adviser should disclose “the costs clients can incur (including fees), 
as well as other forms of compensation;” and “relevant technological, operational, and 
market risks” to its clients.39  
b. Suitability 
Investment advisers are obligated to act in their clients’ best interests and to provide 
only suitable investment advice.40  As discussed above, robo-advisers rely on 
questionnaires to gather information from clients, which may pose issues unique to 
robo-advisers.  The SEC suggests that robo-advisers consider the following when 
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39 Barbara Novick and Bo Lu, Robo Advisors Come of Age:  Part Two, BLACKROCK (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@blackrock/robo-advisors-come-of-age-part-two-d5fa66b91cad.  
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determining whether they have gathered sufficient information with which to make 
suitable recommendations: 
 Whether the questions elicit sufficient information to allow the robo-
adviser to conclude that its initial recommendations and ongoing 
investment advice are suitable and appropriate for that client based on 
his or her financial situation and investment objectives; 
 Whether the questions in the questionnaire are sufficiently clear and/or 
whether the questionnaire is designed to provide additional clarification 
or examples to clients when necessary (e.g., through the use of design 
features, such as tool-tips or popup boxes); and  
 Whether steps have been taken to address inconsistent client responses, 
such as:  
o Incorporating into the questionnaire design features to alert a 
client when his or her responses appear internally inconsistent 
and suggest that the client may wish to reconsider such 
responses; or  
o Implementing systems to automatically flag apparently 
inconsistent information provided by a client for review or follow-
up by the robo-adviser.41 
The SEC also discussed the ability of clients to modify the recommended investment 
strategy; however, often the client is not given the opportunity to discuss how such a 
variance impacts the overall suitability of the resulting portfolio.  Accordingly, the SEC 
suggests that robo-advisers consider “providing commentary as to why it believes 
particular portfolios may be more appropriate for a given investment objective and risk 
profile.”42 
c. Compliance 
Finally, the SEC provided guidance with respect to how a robo-adviser may develop an 
adequate compliance program.  Like human investment advisers, robo-advisers must 
“adopt, implement, and annually review written policies and procedures that are 
reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act and the rules thereunder, 
and that take into consideration the nature of the firm’s operations and the risk 
exposures created by such operations.”43  In addition to the policies and procedures 
adopted by traditional investment advisers, the SEC recommends that robo-advisers 
address the following areas: 
 The development, testing, and backtesting of the algorithmic code and 
the post-implementation monitoring of its performance (e.g., to ensure 
that the code is adequately tested before, and periodically after, it is 
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integrated into the robo-advisers’ platform; the code performs as 
represented; and any modifications to the code would not adversely 
affect client accounts);  
 The questionnaire eliciting sufficient information to allow the robo-
adviser to conclude that its initial recommendations and ongoing 
investment advice are suitable and appropriate for that client based on 
his or her financial situation and investment objectives;  
 The disclosure to clients of changes to the algorithmic code that may 
materially affect their portfolios;  
 The appropriate oversight of any third party that develops, owns, or 
manages the algorithmic code or software modules utilized by the robo-
adviser;  
 The prevention and detection of, and response to, cybersecurity threats; 
 The use of social and other forms of electronic media in connection with 
the marketing of advisory services (e.g., websites; Twitter; 
compensation of bloggers to publicize services; “refer-a-friend” 
programs); and  
 The protection of client accounts and key advisory systems.44 
Robo-advisers should consider the unique aspects of their business to ensure they have 
designed adequate compliance systems.   
B. FINRA Guidance 
Similar to the SEC, FINRA has also offered guidance with respect to the governance and 
supervision of investment recommendations which utilize digital advice tools.45  FINRA 
focused on two main aspects of governance and supervision:  “1) the algorithms that 
drive digital investment tools; and 2) the construction of client portfolios, including 
potential conflicts of interest that may arise in those portfolios.”46 
a. Algorithms 
Algorithms are the core of digital investment advice.  FINRA suggests that firms assess 
“whether the algorithm is consistent with the firm’s investment and analytical 
approaches.”47  As an example, FINRA recognizes that the digital investment advice tool 
may be premised on Modern Portfolio Theory, and “use a passive, index-based approach 
to investing based on the risk tolerance of the client, while others incorporate active 
management of investment portfolios.”48  Accordingly, firms must understand the 
methodology embedded in the algorithm, including assumptions made, and determine 
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45 See FINRA, Report on Digital Investment Advice (Mar. 2016) (“FINRA Report”), 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf.  




whether it is what the firm desires.49  Specifically, FINRA recommends that firms 
conduct both initial and on-going reviews of the algorithms: 
 Initial reviews  
o Assessing whether the methodology a tool uses, including any 
related assumptions, is well-suited to the task;  
o Understanding the data inputs that will be used; and  
o Testing the output to assess whether it conforms with a firm’s 
expectations.  
 Ongoing reviews  
o Assessing whether the models a tool uses remain appropriate as 
market and other conditions evolve;  
o Testing the output of the tool on a regular basis to ensure that it 
is performing as intended; and  
o Identifying individuals who are responsible for supervising the 
tool. 
Failure to adhere to these guidelines may result in an enforcement action.  In 2011, the 
SEC instituted proceedings against AXA Rosenberg Group LLC, AXA Rosenberg 
Investment Management LLC (ARIM), and Barr Rosenberg Research Center LLC 
(BRRC).50  ARIM was an institutional money manager that specialized in quantitative 
investment strategies; and BRRC developed the code used by the strategies.51  In 2007, 
BRRC introduced an update to one of the components of the strategy which contained a 
material error.52  However, although BRRC conducted simulations utilizing the new 
component, the simulations did not detect the error.53  Although the error was 
eventually discovered, it took almost a year for the firms to disclose the error to the SEC, 
and then its clients.54  The error caused over $216 million in losses for the affected 
clients.55  As a result, the firms were required to make restitution to the affected clients, 
retain an independent compliance consultant, and undergo periodic compliance 
reviews.56  Firms can learn from this action – test the code and be upfront if something 
goes wrong.   
b. Constructing Portfolios and Conflicts of Interest 
The initial step in constructing a suitable portfolio is to adequately profile the customer.  
FINRA found that client-facing digital advice tools gathered information through 
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questionnaires containing a few as four and as many as twelve questions.57  The 
questions fell into five broad categories, “personal information, financial information, 
investment objective, time horizon and risk tolerance.”58  FINRA identified the following 
concerns regarding whether the digital tool would meet the customer-specific suitability 
obligation: 
 Does the tool seek to obtain all of the required investment profile 
factors?  
 If not, has the firm established a reasonable basis to believe that the 
particular factor is not necessary?  
 How does the tool handle conflicting responses to customer profile 
questions?  
 What are the criteria, assumptions and limitations for determining that 
a security or investment strategy is suitable for a customer?  
 Does the tool favor any particular securities and, if yes, what is the basis 
for such treatment?  
 Does the tool consider concentration levels and, if so, at what levels (e.g., 
particular securities, class of securities, industry sector)?59 
Once the profile is obtained, a firm must assess the client’s risk tolerance.  Risk 
tolerance may consist of both risk capacity and risk willingness.  FINRA describes the 
two components as follows: 
Risk capacity measures an investor’s ability to take risk or absorb loss. This 
can be a function of an investor’s time horizon, liquidity needs, investment 
objectives and financial situation. For example, a 25-year-old customer 
opening an account for the purpose of retirement likely has a greater risk 
capacity than a 25-year-old investing to finance graduate school education 
in three years.  
Separately, a customer’s risk willingness measures the customer’s attitude 
towards risk. For example, a customer who is willing to absorb a potential 
20 percent loss over one year in return for a higher upside potential has a 
higher risk willingness than a customer focused on principal protection. 
Problems can arise when risk willingness exceeds risk capacity.60 
Risk tolerance may be self-assessed by the client by, for example, selecting a tolerance 
from a range of “conservative” to “aggressive.”61  Other firms utilize scenarios or 
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hypotheticals which gage an investor’s risk tolerance.62  For example, a client may be 
asked how much money they are willing to risk to achieve a particular gain.63   
Firms must also have some way of reconciling contradictory responses on the 
questionnaire.  FINRA found that some firms “averaged contradictory responses” or 
“used the more conservative of the contradictory responses.”64  FINRA found issues with 
both practices, as they may result in a portfolio that does not align with the client’s 
desired risk.65  FINRA noted that firms may reconcile contradictory statements “through 
discussions with the customer, or, in a purely digital environment, by making a 
customer aware of contradictory responses and asking additional questions to resolve 
the inconsistency.”66 
Firms may also engage in automatic rebalancing of client portfolios.  FINRA suggests 
that firms consider the following practices if it is going to engage in automatic 
rebalancing: 
 Explicitly establishing customer intent that the automatic rebalancing 
should occur;  
 Apprising the customer of the potential cost and tax implications of the 
rebalancing;  
 Disclosing to customers how the rebalancing works, including:  
o If the firm uses drift thresholds, disclosing what the thresholds 
are and whether the thresholds vary by asset class;  
o If rebalancing is scheduled, disclosing whether rebalancing 
occurs monthly, quarterly or annually;  
 Developing policies and procedures that define how the tool will act in 
the event of a major market movement; and  
 Developing methods that minimize the tax impact of rebalancing.67 
Last, firms must consider conflicts of interest present in robo-advice.  Robo-advisers 
typically offer portfolios comprised primarily of ETFs that, “in comparison to mutual 
funds, offer little room for revenue streams and payment shares that would otherwise 
create a conflict of interest for investment advisers (e.g., 12b-1 fees, subtransfer agent 
fees).”68  However, that does not mean that robo-advisers are completely free of 
conflicts.  
FINRA recognizes two categories of conflicts:  employee vs. client and firm vs. client.69  
FINRA describes the conflicts as follows:   
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68 Klass, supra n. 1, 9. 
69 FINRA Report, supra n. 45, 6. 
  
Purely digital client-facing tools eliminate the first of these conflicts because 
financial professionals are not involved in the advice process. Hybrid digital 
platforms—those that include a role for a financial professional in providing 
advice—may face these conflicts, depending on the incentive structure for 
the financial professional. Firm vs. client conflicts, however, may remain 
present for both financial professional- and client-facing digital advice 
tools, for example if a firm offers products or services from an affiliate or 
receives payments or other benefits from providers of the products or 
services.70 
FINRA found that some firms avoid conflicts by not using proprietary or affiliated funds 
or funds that provide revenue sharing payments.71  Other firms opt for disclosure.72  
FINRA recommends that a robo-adviser disclose “if the digital advice tool favors certain 
securities and, if so, explain the reason for the selectivity and state, if applicable, that 
other investments not considered may have characteristics, such as cost structure, 
similar or superior to those being analyzed.”73 
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